

WECC 2015 Kyoto, Japan

Research and Development Programs for Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning

Executive Director

Kiichi Suganuma

Outline of IRID

1. Name

International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

2. Location of Main Office

5F 3Toyo Kaiji Building, 23-1 Nishi-shinbashi 2-chome, Minato-ku Tokyo 105-0003, Japan

website: http://www.irid.or.jp/en

3. Membership (18)

Research Institutes: Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA),

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

Manufacturers, etc.: TOSHIBA Corporation, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.,

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., ATOX Co., Ltd.

Electric Utilities, etc.: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., Hokuriku Electric Power Company, Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., The Japan Atomic Power Company, Electric Power Development Co., Ltd., Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited



Scope of Business

IRID gathers knowledge and ideas from around the world for the purpose of R&D in the area of nuclear decommissioning under the integrated management system.

R&D for Decommissioning

R&D projects:


- ·Investigation of damaged PCV and preparation of repair tools
- Preparation for fuel debris retrieval
- •Treatment and disposal of radioactive waste

Promotion of Collaboration on Decommissioning with Domestic and International Parties

Development
of Human Resource
for R&D



Role of IRID in Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS)





Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap

December 2011 (1st Roadmap issued)

November 2013

December 2021

30 to 40 years in the future

Efforts to stabilize plant condition	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	
<achieve cold="" shutdown=""></achieve>	Commencement of the removal of the	Commencement of the	Period up to the completion of	
Cold shutdown stateSignificantly reduce radiation releases	fuel from the spent fuel pool (within 2 years)	retrieval of the fuel debris (within 10 years)	decommissioning measures (30 to 40 years)	



Began removal of the spent fuel from Unit 4 on Nov.18, 2013

The Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap was amended on June 12, 2015, and the target time frames (milestones) were specified.

[Fuel Debris Retrieval]

- Decision of principle plan for fuel debris retrieval of each Unit
- Confirmation of fuel debris retrieval method for the initial Unit
- Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the initial Unit

within 2 years

by the first half of FY2018


by December 2021



Current Condition of Each Unit at Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Based on the estimation about the PCV and reactor core conditions of Unit 1-3, priorities of R&D were decided as below

[Unit 1]




 Almost all melted fuel dropped to the RPV's lower part plenum, little is left in the reactor core




R&D priority

 Fuel debris possibly spread to the outside of the pedestal. Therefore, investigation on the outside of pedestal is the priority.

[Unit 2]



[Unit 3]



- A part of melted fuel dropped to the RPV's lower part plenum or PCV pedestal and a part of the fuel remains in the reactor core
- At Unit 3, more melted fuel than estimated might have dropped to the PCV

R&D priority




- Compare to Unit 1, it is less possible that fuel debris spread to the outside of the pedestal, so investigation the inside of pedestal is the priority.
- Regarding Unit 3 investigation, accumulated radioactive water level is higher than the height of the penetration which will be used for investigations of Unit 1 and 2. Therefore, it is necessary to use different penetration.



Concept Image of Work Steps for Fuel Debris Retrieval

- Retrieving the fuel debris submerged in water is a favorable approach from the viewpoint of minimizing radioactive exposure of workers.
- Investigation and repairing methods for filling the PCV with water have been studied
- Further R&D for collecting, transferring and storing of fuel debris is in progress.
- For each Unit, a retrieval method will be chosen from among candidate methods

(submersion, in-air, upper-entry or side-entry) in the first half of FY2018.





Evaluation of Long Term Integrity of spent fuel (FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ **Dose Reduction**

Remotely Operated Decontamination Equipment (FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage Technology of PCV (FY 2015)

> **Full-Scale** Test (FY 2015)

Investigation/Analysis

in the Reactor

Detection of **Fuel Debris** (FY 2015)

Investigation

Investigation Inside PCV (FY 2015)

Investigation Inside RPV (FY 2015)

Accident Progression **Analysis** (FY 2015)

Characterization

Identifying **Properties of Fuel Debris** (FY 2015-2016)

Debris Retrieval

PCV/RPV **Integrity Evaluation** (FY 2015) **Fundamental** Retrieval Technology for Fuel Debris & **Reactor Internals Criticality Control** (FY 2015-2016) in Fuel Debris Retrieval

Upgrading of Retrieval

& Reactor Internals

(FY 2015-2016)

Method for Fuel Debris Collecting, **Transferring** and Storing of **Fuel Debris** (FY 2015-2016)

(FY 2015)

Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal



Evaluation of Long
Term Integrity of
spent fuel
(FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/
Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage Technology of PCV (FY 2015)

Test (FY 2015)

Full-Scale

Investigation/Analysis in the Reactor

Detection of Fuel Debris (FY 2015)

Investigation

Investigation Inside PCV (FY 2015)

Investigation Inside RPV (FY 2015) Accident
Progression
Analysis
(FY 2015)

Characterization

Identifying
Properties of
Fuel Debris
(FY 2015-2016)

Debris Retrieval


PCV/RPV Integrity Evaluation (FY 2015) **Fundamental** Retrieval Technology for Fuel Debris & Criticality Control Reactor Internals in Fuel Debris (FY 2015-2016) Retrieval (FY 2015) Upgrading of Retrieval Method for Fuel Debris Collecting, & Reactor Internals **Transferring** (FY 2015-2016) and Storing of Fuel Debris (FY 2015-2016)

Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal



Dose Rate Goals after decontamination

Dose rate reduction goals to be achieved using the decontamination equipment
 (the necessity of PCV leakage investigation and repair work, and overall dose reduction scenario)
 3 mSv/h for work area
 5 mSv/h for access route





3 mSv/h to10mSv/h

10 mSv/h to 20mSv/h

* Mapping results of the dose rates at planned operation areas(with needs of dose reduction) derived from PCV investigation and repair project

Out of study due to the lack of data


20 mSv/h to 50mSv/h


More than 50mSv/h

Results and Future Plan of Decontamination Equipment Development

Upper floors


- •FY2013: design
- FY2014-2015: production, verification test, applicability study of actual device






High places

- FY2013: design, production
- FY2014-2015: improvement, verification test, applicability study of actual device



Dry ice blast



High pressure water jet



Suction/Blast

Low places < Development completed >

- •FY2011-2012: design, production, test in 2F
- FY2013: improvement, verification test (factory, 1F)







Suction/Blast

High pressure water jet

Dry ice blast



Term Integrity of spent fuel (FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage
Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage
Technology of PCV
(FY 2015)

Full-Scale Test (FY 2015)

Investigation/Analysis in the Reactor

Detection of Fuel Debris (FY 2015)

Investigation

Investigation Inside PCV (FY 2015)

Investigation Inside RPV (FY 2015) Accident
Progression
Analysis
(FY 2015)

Characterization

Identifying
Properties of
Fuel Debris
(FY 2015-2016)

Debris Retrieval


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Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal




Target Areas for Water Leakage Stoppage at PCV

PCV Penetration (Small rooms)




D/W Shell (repair)


PCV Penetration (Open spaces) Non Cement (temporal)



Vent Piping, Down Comer




A half-scale test



PCV Connecting Piping in torus room

Cement Depositing

S/C Support, Torus Room **Penetrations** Cement Filling





Evaluation of Long
Term Integrity of
spent fuel
(FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage
Technology of PCV
(FY 2015)

Full-Scale Test (FY 2015)

Investigation/Analysis

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
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Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal




Assessing Conditions inside Reactor by Muon Observation Technology







Measurement by Transmission Method

- Detectors were installed at the north and north-west corners of Unit 1 reactor building (late January, 2015)
- Measured from February through May
- Detectors were shielded by 10 cm thick iron plates











<u>Estimation of Fuel Debris Location Based on Comparison between</u> <u>Design Image and Measurement</u>




- Measured data, though it does not clearly indicate, shows that equipment, etc. are detected at locations where they are supposed to exist based on the design documents
- The boundaries of the PCV and the RPV in the image acquired from measurement matches those in the image drawn from design data.
- High density material (fuel debris) is not detected at the area where fuel assemblies are originally installed.







Measurement by Scattering Method

- ◆ Detectors will be installed in front of the R/B and 2nd Floor in T/B (Operation Floor) at Unit 2
- Background radiation should be eliminated by shielding and algorism
- ◆The detector in front of the R/B should be shielded by 8 cm thick iron plates
- ◆ The detector on the second floor of the T/B will not be shielded because of low background radiation









Term Integrity of spent fuel

(FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage Technology of PCV (FY 2015)

Full-Scale Test (FY 2015)

Investigation/Analysis

in the Reactor

Detection of Fuel Debris (FY 2015)

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Investigation
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(FY 2015)

Investigation Inside RPV (FY 2015)

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Identifying
Properties of
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(FY 2015-2016)

Debris Retrieval


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Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal



Investigation inside the PCV (Unit 1)

- [Investigated area] 1st^t floor grating outside the pedestal
- [Steps for investigation and device development]
- (1) Investigation from X-100 penetration (FY 2015)
 - 1. Acquire information about the grating area on the 1st floor (access point to the basement, etc.): B1 (finished)
 - 2. Acquire images showing the outside of the pedestal on the basement floor (esp. access entrance and nearby vent tube) following the results of investigation at the torus room using a small boat in November 2013: B2 (planning)
- (2) Investigation from X-6 penetration (FY 2016-2017) (after decontamination around the X-6 penetration)
 - 1. Acquire further information about outside the pedestal on the basement floor by using fuel debris shape measurement apparatus: B3



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
No.2 finishes.


B1 Investigation Completed in April, 2015

(1)Overview of equipment

- Shape-changing crawler equipment
- Inserted from the narrow access entrance (X-100B penetration: φ100 mm)
- Travel on the grating stably.

(2) Image of investigation routes








Results of B1 Investigation

Investigated area	Results
Access point to the basement	 For the next investigation (outside the pedestal on the basement), it is confirmed that there is an access point to the basement and no obstacles around it
CRD rail	 Could not reach to the CRD rail Could not recognize the CRD rail by evaluation of image-processed pictures, which were taken from the farthest reaching point by the investigation camera
En route of investigation	 No major damage was found inside the PCV equipment (HVH, PLR Line, pedestal wall, etc.) At every investigating point, temperature and dose rate were recorded.

<Access point to the basement>














(Image at mock-up facility)



Investigation inside the PCV (Unit 2)

- [Investigated area] On the platform inside the pedestal (Upper surface of platform and CRD housing)
 - Basement floor
- (1) Investigation from X-6 penetration (Φ115 mm) (FY2015): A2
- (2) Investigation from X-6 (Enlarge hole) (FY2016- 2017): A3 and A4
 - Insert debris visualization system, investigate inside the pedestal.





Evaluation of Long
Term Integrity of
spent fuel
(FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage
Technology of PCV
(FY 2015)

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Debris Retrieval

PCV/RPV Integrity Evaluation (FY 2015)

in Fuel Debris
Retrieval
(FY 2015)

Collecting, Transferring and Storing of Fuel Debris (FY 2015-2016) Fundamental
Retrieval Technology
for Fuel Debris &
Reactor Internals
(FY 2015-2016)

Upgrading of
Retrieval Method
for Fuel Debris
& Reactor Internals
(FY 2015-2016)


Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal




Outline: R&D for Fuel Debris Retrieval Methods

Selected options of fuel debris retrieval


a. Submerged-top access method



b. Dry-top access method



c. Dry-side access method



- According to the Technical Strategic Plan*, the three methods above will be studied
- Major issues to be studied (regarding the three methods)
 - 1. Examine the feasibility of each method
 - 2. Conduct a conceptual study on a system to judge the feasibility of each method
 - 3. Design fuel debris retrieval equipment and draw up its development plan
- 4. Based on 1.-3. above, draw up development plans of systems and equipment to retrieve fuel debris and reactor internals

^{*}Technical Strategic Plan 2015 for Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, April 3, 2017)



Outline: R&D for Technology of Retrieving Fuel Debris and Core Internals

Ocontents

As for the three methods of fuel debris retrieval, develop and evaluate element technologies necessary to judge the feasibility of each method.

O Issues for developing technologies of fuel debris retrieval


Issues common to the methods of fuel debris retrieval are as follows:

- 1) Cutting of fuel debris
- 2) Remote operation
- 3) Prevention of expansion of contamination
- 4) Shielding
- 5) Criticality prevention

© Element test

Conduct following element tests

- 1) Technology for preventing contamination expansion
- 2) Technology for accessing fuel debris
- 3) Technology for remote operation
- 4) Technology for reducing exposure of workers
- 5) Cutting, dust collection, visualization and measurement technologies





Evaluation of Long
Term Integrity of
spent fuel
(FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/ Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated
Decontamination
Equipment
(FY 2015)

Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage Technology of PCV (FY 2015)

> Test (FY 2015)

Full-Scale

Investigation/Analysis in the Reactor

Detection of Fuel Debris (FY 2015)

Investigation

Investigation Inside PCV (FY 2015)

Investigation Inside RPV (FY 2015)

(FY 2015)
Characterization

Accident

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Identifying
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(FY 2015-2016)

Debris Retrieval


PCV/RPV Integrity Evaluation **Fundamental** (FY 2015) Retrieval Technology for Fuel Debris & Criticality Control Reactor Internals in Fuel Debris (FY 2015-2016) Retrieval Upgrading of Retrieval (FY 2015) Method for Fuel Debris Collecting, & Reactor Internals Transferring (FY 2015-2016) and Storing of **Fuel Debris** (FY 2015-2016)

Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal



Characteristics of Nuclear Waste Generated from Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident

- The waste was created under the uncontrollable condition due to the accident
- The contamination originated from damaged fuel of Unit 1 to 3.*
- It is difficult to estimate the amount of the waste because decommissioning work changes according to the site condition
- Analytical data, (especially on the composition of long half-life nuclides), are extremely limited because the contaminated area is large and some highly contaminated areas exist.




[Rubble/Felled and removed trees, etc.]

Rubble

Felled and removed

Soil

- ✓ Large quantity and widely distributed
- ✓ Poor experience with the treatment and disposal of felled and removed trees and soil
- ✓ Surface contamination by scattering/ diffusion is main contamination and some contamination is penetrating contamination caused by accumulated water.



[Fuel debris/Demolishing waste]

- ✓ Large amount and high dose rate
- ✓ Difficult to sample actual waste due to low accessibility at present

Secondary waste by water treatmentl

Secondary waste (from contaminated) water treatment

Replaced pipes, Storage tanks

- ✓ Poor experiences of treatment and disposal
- ✓ Difficult to collect the waste
- ✓ Partial estimation of quantity and kind of nuclide may be possible based on the characteristics of water treatment equipment

* Activation products and waste from operation may be included



Comparison between Wastes from Accident and Operation

Item of uncertainty	Waste from operation	Waste from accident
Generation of waste [quantity, type, period]	0	Δ
Handling (collecting/classifying) [difficulty]	0	Δ
Characterization [sufficiency of information, difficulty of sampling, representativeness of sample]	0	Δ
Technologies for processing and packaging waste	0	?∼△
Burial and disposal methods and safety assessment	Δ~Ο	?
Regulations, technical standards, guidelines, siting	Δ~Ο	?

 \odot : Fully understood or good prospect, \bigcirc : Fair prospect, \triangle : Limited,

?: Cannot be discussed

- Waste generated from operation has its own problem but is <u>fairly under control</u>.
 - •Information on basic properties of waste, including quantity at present, future change, activity and chemical substances contained in individual waste is identified.
 - •Both unprocessed and processed wastes are appropriately stored and managed in accordance with the current regulations.
 - Regulations and standards, as well as disposal method and safety assessment method, have been in place.
- Many uncertainties poses important technical problems to disposal of the accident-generated waste at the Fukushima Daiichi. Solving these uncertainties and bringing the waste under control are the major goals of countermeasures and technology development.



Technologies and R&D for Waste Treatment and Disposal


Waste Stream Study

Waste stream: A series of handling accident-generated waste from its generation to storage, finally to treatment and disposal



Technology information on treatment and disposal (including precondition), information related to the policy and system

Integrated judgment and adjustment for each research result, presentation of required agenda towards implementation of safe and rational treatment and disposal





<u>Finally - Forward Fuel Debris Retrieval-</u>

- ➤ Fuel debris retrieval at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is expected to be more difficult compared to that of the accident at the Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2). It is necessary to put domestic and international wisdom together to develop the whole strategy, method and equipment for fuel debris retrieval.
- In order to complete the fuel debris retrieval, it is necessary to clarify the purpose and goal of relating each project, and then, to develop technologies flexibly by planning with an aim to achieve not partial but overall optimization.
- In making strategy, it is important to consider end-state (what you wish to achieve at the end), study various feasible options and always prepare alternative options.



Thank you for you attention

